Human Rights Watch – Submission to the CERD review of China
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If these estimates are true, that means that at least one—and perhaps far more—of every ten Uyghur men lives in a re-education camp right now.
Those numbers come from an article published by the Associated Press two weeks ago. [1] This week’s Economist lists a similar tally. It goes on to describe in detail a few of the other things happening in the sands of old Turkestan:
Under a system called fanghuiju, teams of half a dozen—composed of policemen or local officials and always including one Uighur speaker, which almost always means a Uighur—go from house to house compiling dossiers of personal information. Fanghuiju is short for “researching people’s conditions, improving people’s lives, winning people’s hearts”. But the party refers to the work as “eradicating tumours”. The teams—over 10,000 in rural areas in 2017—report on “extremist” behaviour such as not drinking alcohol, fasting during Ramadan and sporting long beards. They report back on the presence of “undesirable” items, such as Korans, or attitudes—such as an “ideological situation” that is not in wholehearted support of the party.
Since the spring of 2017, the information has been used to rank citizens’ “trustworthiness” using various criteria. People are deemed trustworthy, average or untrustworthy depending on how they fit into the following categories: 15 to 55 years old (ie, of military age); Uighur (the catalogue is explicitly racist: people are suspected merely on account of their ethnicity); unemployed; have religious knowledge; pray five times a day (freedom of worship is guaranteed by China’s constitution); have a passport; have visited one of 26 countries; have ever overstayed a visa; have family members in a foreign country (there are at least 10,000 Uighurs in Turkey); and home school their children. Being labelled “untrustworthy” can lead to a camp.
To complete the panorama of human surveillance, the government has a programme called “becoming kin” in which local families (mostly Uighur) “adopt” officials (mostly Han). The official visits his or her adoptive family regularly, lives with it for short periods, gives the children presents and teaches the household Mandarin. He also verifies information collected by fanghuiju teams. The programme appears to be immense. According to an official report in 2018, 1.1m officials have been paired with 1.6m families. That means roughly half of Uighur households have had a Han-Chinese spy/indoctrinator assigned to them.
Such efforts map the province’s ideological territory family by family; technology maps the population’s activities street by street and phone by phone. In Hotan and Kashgar there are poles bearing perhaps eight or ten video cameras at intervals of 100-200 metres along every street; a far finer-grained surveillance net than in most Chinese cities. As well as watching pedestrians the cameras can read car number plates and correlate them with the face of the person driving. Only registered owners may drive cars; anyone else will be arrested, according to a public security official who accompanied this correspondent in Hotan. The cameras are equipped to work at night as well as by day.
Because the government sees what it calls “web cleansing” as necessary to prevent access to terrorist information, everyone in Xinjiang (East Turkistan) is supposed to have a spywear app on their mobile phone. Failing to install the app, which can identify people called, track online activity and record social-media use, is an offence. “Wi-Fi sniffers” in public places keep an eye, or nose, on all networked devices in range.
Next, the records associated with identity cards can contain biometric data including fingerprints, blood type and DNA information as well as the subject’s detention record and “reliability status”. The government collects a lot of this biometric material by stealth, under the guise of a public-health programme called “Physicals for All”, which requires people to give blood samples. Local officials “demanded [we] participate in the physicals,” one resident of Kashgar told Human Rights Watch, an NGO. “Not participating would have been seen as a problem…”
A system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), first revealed by Human Rights Watch, uses machine-learning systems, information from cameras, smartphones, financial and family-planning records and even unusual electricity use to generate lists of suspects for detention. One official WeChat report said that verifying IJOP’s lists was one of the main responsibilities of the local security committee. Even without high-tech surveillance, Xinjiang (East Turkistan)’s police state is formidable. With it, it becomes terrifying. [2]
Contemplate these things. We are over-due for a moral accounting.
Over the last two years, a substantial part of my income has come through leading reading seminars with Chinese students who will go on to study in American universities. We’ve read history, philosophy, and literature together. Some of my students have said very nice things to me over these two years. The most flattering compliment any of my students have ever offered me was only given two weeks ago. At the completion of one of the seminars, the student told me that she had never met (nor heard of) an American who was as fair to China as I was. It was a small thing, but coming as it did from one of the seminar’s shiest students (and what is more, after grades had been submitted!), it was meaningful to me. One engages differently with different audiences, of course. I suspect that those who read this blog or my twitter feed will be surprised to hear comments like that; I make no apology for the hard line I take with the Party. But my goal has always been to understand issues as they are seen from the inside, and when the occasion demands it, to articulate them in a way that even the ardent Party faithful would agree with. In some cases this is easy. The Party line on America is actually, in many respects, a far more accurate vision of American foreign policy than many of the things we Americans—left or right—like to tell ourselves. But not all issues are so easy. Still, I try. My student’s comment was a small confirmation that my efforts have not completely been in vain.
I take a similar approach to the history we study. I have studied many of the nastiest parts of modern history with my students. Slavery. Japanese war-mongering. The Holocaust. My approach to these atrocities is simple: it is not enough to empathize with the victims. That is easy. It is also mostly useless. The real challenge is to try and feel the emotions, understand the fears, and take seriously the ideas that lead perpetrators to commit the crimes they did. One must not just sympathize with the tyrannized–one must also try and sympathize with the tyrant.
Why is this necessary? Why focus just as much on the experience and fears of the slaver as the slave? Because you are far more likely to become a slaver than you are to suffer as a slave. In his book on the 14 million people murdered by the Soviet and Nazi regimes in Eastern Europe, historian Timothy Snyder makes this point well:
It is far more inviting, at least today in the West, to identify with the victims than to understand the historical setting that they shared with perpetrators and bystanders in the bloodlands…Yet it is unclear whether this identification with victims brings much knowledge, or whether this kind of alienation from the murderer is an ethical stance. It is not at all obvious that reducing history to morality plays makes anyone moral….It is easy to sanctify policies or identities by the deaths of the victims. It is less appealing, but morally more urgent, to understand the actions of the perpetrators. The moral danger, after all, is never that one might become a victim but that one might be a perpetrator or a bystander. [3]
So one must try and sympathize with the tyrant. But one must not forget what tyranny is.
We see tyranny before us today. To put it bluntly: the Communist Party of China is an enemy to freedom of worship and freedom of conscience. With a small exception to be made (depending on how one counts) for North Korea, there is no greater. No tyranny in human history has ruled more people than the Party does now. But we must be truthful about the nature of this tyranny. Tyranny can be popular. If we are honest we will recognize that many—perhaps even most—of the Party’s subjects are quite content being just that: subjects. Not all people cry for freedom.
Xinjiang (East Turkistan) is different. Here a people is crying. They have been subjected to a new and frightening form of despotism, a terrible marriage of terror and technology. To enforce this new tyranny the Party has imprisoned one out of every twelve to one out of every six adults. Each has been subjected to torture (or the threat of it), insult, betrayal (or the threat of it), and an attack on all they hold sacred. Each has been plugged into an Orwellian system of surveillance that rates, rewards, and punishes them for everything they do or identify with. There is nothing else in our world like it.
There are moral hazards here.
The hazards have layers. The prison torturer is more culpable that the prison guard, who is more culpable than the bureaucrat next door, who in turn is more culpable than the bureaucrat in a distant province. But each is part of system that keeps the machine of torture and tyranny rolling. Each man might contribute only his mite—but 1.3 billion mites is a heavy yoke to bear.
Yet it is not just Chinese who add in their mites. Every businessman, every investor, every pundit, and every well-oiled ex-politician must search themselves. Do their words, deeds, or funds help hold up the machine? We cannot say anymore “well that’s just Xinjiang (East Turkistan)” or “most of the Party isn’t that bad.” There are one million people in concentration camps! Those kind of comments could be allowed a decade ago—but not now. Things are now far too terrible for that.
I leave Beijing shortly. I am fortunate. I will not be a part—even a small little part—of this system any longer. My plans to leave were finalized before these reports were made public, so I cannot claim any special virtue here. But I am glad that I will not need to lose any sleep over being a cog in the infernal machine. I am luckier than most: I have the opportunity to leave. Most Chinese will never be given the chance to escape the moral hazard the Party quite purposefully forces them into.
We—and by we I mean all non-Chinese reading this—do have that chance.
A moral accounting is in order. I don’t ask for a witch hunt. I stand against twitter mobs as a matter of principle. Far better for this to be a matter of private change, not public shame. But for that to happen we need this first step: the recognition that the PRC of 2018 belongs in the same moral category that we placed the USSR in during 1950s. There are those among us who would not imagine supporting the Gulags of that regime, but do not feel so strongly about the Gulags of our own day. If you are one of these people, the time has come to ask yourself: why?
https://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2018/06/moral-hazards-and-china.html?m=1
[1] Gerry Shih, “China’s Mass Indoctorination Camps Evoke Cultural Revolution” Associated Press, May 2018.
[2] “China has turned Xinjiang (East Turkistan) into a Police State Like No Other” The Economist, 31 May 2018.
[3] Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 400.
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ most recent census, China is the world’s leading jailer of journalists, with 49 imprisoned as of December 2015. Of those 49, at least 14 are Uyghurs—a startling proportion given that the Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group, living in the country’s northwest Xinjiang (East Turkistan) Uyghur Autonomous region, makes up less than one percent of the country’s population. That disproportionation, however, is less surprising to those familiar with the long-fraught relationship between the Uyghur people and China’s authoritarian government.
Uyghurs, unlike the rest of China’s 55 officially designated minority groups (with the other exception being the Tibetans), have a history, albeit a short one, as an independent nation. The region gained independence as the East Turkestan Republic in 1933 and again, after being sacked by the Chinese Muslim army during the Kumul Rebellion, in 1944. The Silk Road region officially came under Communist rule when the party took control of China in 1949.
Since then, the state has sponsored mass migration of the Han Chinese, China’s predominant ethnic group, to Xinjiang (East Turkistan) to support economic development; Han now comprise nearly half the region’s population. Meanwhile, the country’s central government has increasingly portrayed Uyghur separatists, who seek to govern themselves and call the Xinjiang (East Turkistan) region East Turkestan, as terrorists—claims that many human rights activists say are exaggerated and an excuse to justify oppressive policies that curtail Uyghur commercial and cultural activities. There are restrictions on Islamic religious practices, and Uyghur language instruction in schools is being phased out. Reports from the region chronicle a pattern of abuse that includes imprisonment, torture, and disappearances.
Tensions came to a head in July 2009 during a major period of discord between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. A series of riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang (East Turkistan)’s capital, left nearly 200 people dead, Chinese authorities reported, most of them Han. In the wake of the incident, thousands of Uyghurs were arrested and detained, including a number of citizen bloggers who are among the country’s currently imprisoned journalists, and others—as many as 10,000, according to exiled Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer—simply disappeared.
The treatment of citizen journalists in the wake of the riots was a familiar story. Uyghurs’ access to the outside world is severely limited—following the unrest, the government enforced a complete Internet and cell service blackout in the region for close to a year—and those trying to disseminate information outside of the vague, incomplete reporting from the state-run media face severe sanctions. Even Uyghurs reporting on the region from abroad are not exempt; Chinese authorities tried to intimidate D.C.-based Radio Free Asia journalist Shohret Hoshur to abandon his reporting on Uyghurs by detaining three of his brothers still living in Urumqi and charging them with leaking state secrets (two of the brothers were released in December). Hoshur has not been deterred, however; this summer, he told The New York Times he feels an obligation to continue reporting on his homeland.
Greg Fay, project manager of the Uyghur Human Rights Project, a nonprofit started in 2004 to promote human rights and democracy for the Uyghur people, talked with Nieman Reports about the heavy restrictions on Uyghur journalism. Below are edited and condensed excerpts of that conversation:
What do we know about the 17 Uyghur journalists—and possibly many more—that are currently imprisoned?
Really very little. Most of them, their prison sentences are not up, but we don’t know the status of many of them. That’s pretty par for the course; it’s very difficult for us to get word from people who are out of prison because the last thing they want to do is violate this extreme restriction on information about the Uyghur people that China enforces so strictly.
One prominent Uyghur scholar/citizen journalist imprisoned is the Bejing-based professor Ilham Tohti. His website was a little different from the Uyghur websites operating at the time because his website was in Chinese. His purpose was to encourage communication between Han Chinese, Uyghurs, and all ethnic groups in China; he was trying to create a forum in which people could interact with one another and learn about issues impacting the region. He was arrested after the riots but later released and forced to move his website to overseas servers, but last year, he was imprisoned and sentenced to life, charged with separatism. That was really the nail in the coffin of this Uyghur citizen journalist movement.
Heavy government restrictions and tight control of information make independent reporting difficult in all of China. In what ways is the Uyghur region unique?
The decimation of the Uyghur Web in 2009 is really unique. The government flicked a switch and cut off all Internet access in this region for 10 months [after the riots], from July 2009 to May 2010, and in doing so also took down all of the most popular Uyghur websites, places where these important conversations about the unrest were taking place. In general, it’s just more difficult for people to access certain tools that are available elsewhere in China, like tools to circumvent the Chinese firewalls or Sina Weibo, the Chinese microblog. We’ve had Uyghur people reporting difficulties accessing these sites, even registering their Uyghur-sounding names, and when they go to post things, we’ve heard reports of lag times of weeks and sometimes it just won’t go up [at all]. That goes far above and beyond what Chinese users experience elsewhere.
And though state-run media across China is heavily restricted, sometimes journalists have a bit more leeway, but you just don’t hear about state journalists in the Uyghur region crossing any lines. Media elsewhere in China don’t really report on Uyghur issues because they acknowledge that this is one area that is simply off-limits.
What challenges do foreign journalists reporting on the Uyghur region face?
There are plenty of restrictions even to get into the region. No international outlets have a bureau in the region or any reporters stationed there. I think also part of what’s really necessary for conducting journalism in China is to have news assistants [such as translators and mediators] regionally, and I think that would be a real challenge for someone to do that in the Uyghur region. There have been several news outlets that have tried to do critical reporting and they have just found that access is so limited; they’re trailed and harassed by authorities, especially when some kind of sensitive incident has taken place. And were these journalists to get access, it would be extremely dangerous for anyone who spoke to them. There have been cases of reprisals facing people who have reported on issues in the region and anybody who is brave enough to act as a source would be putting themselves and their families at risk.
[Following the riots], the U.S. media did its best to try to figure out what was going on at that time, but their access was extremely limited. Foreign media was trying to get the story but, at the end of the day, the kind of hard, investigative reporting that you would really need to find out what happened, particularly to the hundreds of Uyghur individuals who disappeared after the incident, who were rounded up, who were imprisoned—that never happened. There are still many, many questions surrounding those events: reports of extrajudicial killings, reports of lack of due process, and disappearances.
How does the persecution of Uyghur journalists mirror the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghur population as a whole?
It’s very reflective of the kind of small space Uyghur people have for freedom of expression. The suppression of journalists prevents not only the outside world but even people in the Uyghur region from knowing what’s going on. What’s going on now is an intensified crackdown on religious practice, limits on mobility and the ability to get a passport; there’s even been an introduction in the region of a new form of identification card that will prevent people from moving between cities. So these other freedoms—freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of religion—are all made that much more vulnerable by the silencing of Uyghur journalists.
How essential is a free press in promoting peace in the region?
I think it’s absolutely essential. Without a free press, people have no means of expressing what’s going on. There’s rapid change taking place in the Uyghur homeland and Uyghur people generally have very little say over what’s happening and how it’s happening. Taking away the mechanisms through which people can discuss these changes and make known how they would like to see development of their homeland take place is going to lead to unrest.
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Genetic studies show that the Uyghurs are the modern hybrid descendants of the indigenous Indo-European of the Tarim Basin and Turkic tribes that inhabited Central Asia. The Uyghurs are not Chinese, nor do they share any linguistic, cultural, religious, or historical ties to China or Chinese culture. In fact, the Uyghurs were largely independent of China and Chinese culture until more recent times (post 1884).
The term ‘Uyghur’ in proto-Turkic means “united or allied”, it has also been defined as “union” or “confederation” and first appeared in recorded history in the 6th century BCE according to ancient Chinese and Indian records. Though it was until the early 5th Century CE that the term Uyghur played a more prominent role in shaping Central Asiatic history, the Uyghur during this term referred to a confederation of 18 Indo-European (Tocharian) and Turkic tribes inhabiting present day East Turkistan (the Xinjiang (East Turkistan) Uyghur Autonomous Region), Kengsu (Gansu), and modern day western Mongolia. These Uyghur tribes we later play a crucial role in the establishment and later dissolution of the KokTurk Khaganate , and ultimately in 744 CE the Uyghur confederation would overthrow the KokTurk Khaganate and establish the Uyghur Khaganate, with it’s capital being in present day Mongolia. Though in 840 the Uyghur Khaganate would be overthrown and several of the Uyghur tribes inhabiting Mongolia would migrate southward and westward, intermixing with the local Uyghur tribes inhabiting the northeastern sections of contemporary East Turkistan (Xinjiang (East Turkistan)).
Though it must be noted that according to genetic studies, the intial intermixing of the native peoples of the Tarim Basin (Tocharians) and the Turkic peoples that led to the “creation” of the hybrid Uyghurs took place between 2200 and 2800 years ago. Furthermore, genetic DNA testing shows that modern Uyghurs range from 64% European (Tocharian) DNA and 36% Asiatic (Turkic) admixture overall with those in the South and Western parts of East Turkistan having a slightly higher level of European DNA and those in the Northeastern sections (bordering Mongolia having a slighlty higher level of Asiatic (Turkic) DNA.
Ultimately, the majority of the Uyghurs are descendants of the original inhabitants of East Turkistan (Tarim Basin/Jungar Basin/Turpan Basin) more so than the Uyghur tribes of what was then Turkic Mongolia.
Also feel free to read this article to understand the Uyghur-China conflict.
According to recent Chinese government policies and the actions that it has taken in recent years it is very likely that China is trying to exterminate the Uyghurs. Further a recent seminar that took place at Hudson Institute on May 4, 2018 with experts on the issues of Uyghurs and human rights such as Professor Rian Thum, Professor James Millward, and Senior Researcher from Freedom House Sarah Cook; suggests that China is more clear than ever before on their intent to exterminate the Uyghurs.
Again all of these 11 points are real issues that are actually acknowledge in part by the Chinese government, yet all of this is a direct violation to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Essentially, it is already a Genocide that has been occurring for quite a while, however should the international community continue to remain silent on the issue, then the world will bear witness to a large scale genocide in the 21st century.
Although Mao Zedong had initially promised the Uyghurs the right self-determination and a choice for independence or federated republic status (like that of the Soviet Union), he went back on his promises and established the so called Xinjiang (East Turkistan) Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955. Yet the Chinese government would gradually launch policies to settle millions of Han Chinese to “modernize and develop” the Uyghur homeland, significantly changing the demography of the Uyghur homeland. Furthermore, in 1958 Mao launched the large-scale collectivization programwhich forced the Uyghurs to abandon their indigenous customs and traditions, forcing them to learn Chinese and embrace Chinese culture.
During the Cultural Revolution, hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs were massacred by the Chinese regime for being “counter revolutionary and nationalists”. It was during this period that China began to rewrite the history of the Uyghurs and East Turkistan, distorting the realities and claiming that “Xinjiang (East Turkistan) (East Turkistan), has always been a part of China since ancient times, and the Uyghurs are part of the larger Chinese family.” Millions of Uyghurs would be killed by various means, including an estimated 750,000 who died as a result of 46 nuclear tests in the Uyghur homeland. Yet over the decades, Uyghurs continued to resist Chinese domination, with numerous uprisings and demonstrations.
Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, Uyghur militants launched an armed uprising on April 5, 1990, which was brutally crushed. However, with the independence of their Central Asian brethren in 1991, Uyghurs once again pushed to strive for theirs. Due to an increase in trade relations with the international community, China began to assert its economic dominance into Central Asia and across the globe to crush any sign of Uyghur political activity. Taking advantage of 9/11, China launched its own ‘War on Terror’ to crush any and all forms of Uyghur dissent. Ultimately, China used the pretext of “combatting terrorism, and extremism” to ban the teaching of the Uyghur language and restrict religious and cultural practices, while making way for the influx of Han Chinese settlers.
Over the years China intensified its repressive policies on the Uyghurs and in 2009 demonstrations erupted all across East Turkistan to protest the policies and demanding equality. The protests were brutally crushed and hundreds of Uyghurs were killed and tens of thousands more were detained as the international community stood in silence. In 2014 the Chinese government sentenced Ilham Tohti, a well-known Uyghur economist professor, to life in prison on “separatism” charges after he asked the Chinese government to uphold its own constitution and honor Uyghur autonomous rights.
Now, new settlement projects are being constructed to accommodate Han Chinese settlers. Restrictions on freedom of movement have been imposed, and tens of thousands of Uyghurs are being detained on “terrorism” charges. On July 28, 2014, thousands of Uyghurs in the city of Yarkent protested against discrimination, inequality, extrajudicial detentions, and mass executions. The result was a massacre of over 2,000 Uyghurs, all whom were labeled as “terrorists”, and again the international community stood silent. China has barred Uyghurs from obtaining passports, observing religious practices such as fasting during Ramadan, attending religious centers, holding large gatherings, and imposing forced abortion on Uyghur families; turning the Uyghur homeland into an Orwellian state. Such restrictions have forced thousands of Uyghurs to take a perilous route and emigrate out of East Turkistan, leading to a Uyghur refugee crisis largely unheard of in the media and ignored by the international community.
Yet, at the same time it has pushed disaffected Uyghurs into the arms of rebel groups and terrorist groups fighting in Syria, with promises of one day assisting the Uyghurs in fighting against the Chinese occupation. On January 1, 2016 China launched a new Counter-terrorism law specifically designed to target the Uyghurs at home and abroad, leaving the Uyghurs extremely vulnerable amidst international silence. Additionally, China’s continued assimilationist and colonial policies have radicalized the Uyghurs, forcing them to turn towards violence as a recourse.
The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) condemns the death in custody of yet another Uyghur religious scholar, which was reported by relatives early this week. 88-year old Abdulnehed Mehsum died while being held in a political indoctrination camp in Hotan prefecture in November 2017, though the death was not reported until May 27, 2018. His death…
The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) has received confirmation from the relatives of Muhammad Salih Hajim of his death in custody. The prominent Quarnic scholar and Uyghur religious leader was 82 years old. On January 24, 2018, UHRP expressed concern about reports of his detention in Urumchi. The exact circumstances of his death are unknown, but he…
UYGHUR WOMAN HANDED 10-YEAR PRISON TERM OVER HEADSCARF CLAIM By Shohret Hoshur – A Chinese court in the country’s northwestern Xinjiang (East Turkistan) (East Turkistan) region has jailed a young Uyghur woman for 10 years over claims by a friend that she had promoted the wearing of headscarves, a form of Islamic dress increasingly restricted by Chinese authorities, sources…
XINJIANG AUTHORITIES SENTENCE UYGHUR SCHOLAR TO 10 YEARS IN PRISON By Shohret Hoshur – Authorities in northwest China’s Xinjiang (East Turkistan) (East Turkistan) region have sentenced a prominent Uyghur theological scholar sponsored by the country’s state-sanctioned Islamic Association to 10 years in prison following his return from Egypt, according to local sources. A faculty member at Xinjiang (East Turkistan) (East Turkistan) Islamic…
Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti celebrates his birthday on 25 October, shortly after he was awarded the prestigious Martin Ennals Award for human rights. But who is he and why is he in prison in China? Ilham Tohti is a respected economist who has highlighted abuses against China’s Uighur minority. A renowned Uighur intellectual in China, Ilham…
Sentence: Imprisoned since 25 May 2016 for 20 years Abdusemet Qarihaji (Chinese: Abudusaimaiti Kere’aji), born in 1926 in Yurchi Township of Kelpin County, is a respected Uyghur religious cleric and teacher from Kelpin County who was arrested on May 10th 2016 and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by the Aksu Prefectural People’s Intermediate Court on May…
Katrina Swett Lantos, President of the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice
“Perfected in China, a threat in the West” The Economist 31st May 2018
Editorial Board – The Washington Post 20th May 2018
In a letter dated April 3, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio and U.S. Representative Chris Smith, the chair and co-chair of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan – July 11, 2009
THEY’RE watching you. When you walk to work, CCTV cameras film you and, increasingly, recognise your face. Drive out of town, and number-plate-reading cameras capture your journey. The smartphone in your pocket leaves a constant digital trail. Browse the web in the privacy of your home, and your actions are logged and analysed. The resulting data can be crunched to create a minute-by-minute record of your life.
Under an authoritarian government such as China’s, digital monitoring is turning a nasty police state into a terrifying, all-knowing one. Especially in the western region of Xinjiang (East Turkistan), China is applying artificial intelligence (AI) and mass surveillance to create a 21st-century panopticon and impose total control over millions of Uighurs, a Turkic-language Muslim minority (see Briefing). In Western democracies, police and intelligence agencies are using the same surveillance tools to solve and deter crimes and prevent terrorism (see Technology Quarterly). The results are effective, yet deeply worrying.
Between freedom and oppression stands a system to seek the consent of citizens, maintain checks and balances on governments and, when it comes to surveillance, set rules to restrain those who collect and process information. But with data so plentiful and easy to gather, these protections are being eroded. Privacy rules designed for the landline phone, postbox and filing cabinet urgently need to be strengthened for the age of the smartphone, e-mail and cloud computing.
I spy with my many eyes
When East Germany collapsed in 1989, people marvelled at the store of information the Stasi security service had garnered on them, and the vast network of informants it took to compile it. Since then the digital revolution has transformed surveillance, as it has so much else, by making it possible to collect and analyse data on an unprecedented scale. Smartphones, web browsers and sensors provide huge quantities of information that governments can hack or collect; data centres allow them to store it indefinitely; AI helps them find needles in the digital haystacks thus assembled. Technologies that once seemed a friend of freedom, allowing dissidents in dictatorships to communicate and organise more easily, now look more Orwellian, letting autocrats watch people even more closely than the Stasi did.
Xinjiang (East Turkistan) is the nightmarish extreme that the new technology makes possible: a racist police state. Fearing insurrection and separatism, China’s rulers have reinforced techniques of totalitarian control—including the mass detention of Uighurs for re-education—with digital technology. In parts of the province streets have poles bristling with CCTV cameras every 100-200 metres. They record each passing driver’s face and the car’s numberplate. Uighurs’ mobile phones must run government-issued spyware. The data associated with their ID cards include not just name, sex and occupation, but can contain relatives’ details, fingerprints, blood type, DNA information, detention record and “reliability status”. All this and more is fed into the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), an AI-powered system, to generate lists of suspects for detention.
Totalitarianism on Xinjiang (East Turkistan)’s scale may be hard to replicate, even across most of China. Repressing an easily identified minority is easier than ensuring absolute control over entire populations. But elements of China’s model of surveillance will surely inspire other autocracies—from Russia to Rwanda to Turkey—to which the necessary hardware will happily be sold. Liberal states have an obligation to expose and chastise this export of oppression, however limited their tools of suasion.
The West must look at itself, too. These days its police forces can also have access to a Stasi’s worth of data. Officers can set up bogus phone towers to track people’s movements and contacts. Data from numberplate-readers can track a person’s movements for years. Some American cities have predictive-policing programs akin to IJOP that analyse past crimes to predict future ones. All this allows the monitoring of possible attackers, but the potential for abuse is great. Hundreds of American police officers are known to have used confidential databases to dig dirt on journalists, ex-girlfriends and others.
Watching the detectives
How to balance freedom and safety? Start by ensuring that the digital world, like the real one, has places where law-abiding people can enjoy privacy. Citizens of liberal democracies do not expect to be frisked without good cause, or have their homes searched without a warrant. Similarly, a mobile phone in a person’s pocket should be treated like a filing cabinet at home. Just as filing cabinets can be locked, encryption should not be curtailed. A second priority is to limit how long information on citizens is kept, constrain who has access to it and penalise its misuse fittingly. In 2006 the European Union issued a directive requiring mobile-phone firms to keep customers’ metadata for up to two years. That law was struck down by the European Court of Justice in 2014. Misuse of police data should be a criminal offence for which people are punished, not a “mistake” absolved by a collective apology.
A third priority is to monitor the use of AI. Predictive-policing systems are imperfect, better at finding patterns of burglary than of, say, murder. Face-recognition may produce lots of “false positive” results. AI trained with biased data—eg, patterns of arrest that feature a disproportionate number of black people—may reproduce those biases. Some sentencing algorithms are more likely to label black defendants than white ones as being at high risk of reoffending. Such algorithms must be open to scrutiny, not protected as trade secrets.
Vigilance and transparency must be the watchwords. They may enhance the technology’s effectiveness: the routine wearing of bodycams by police, for instance, appears to reduce public complaints. Consultation matters, too. A bill recently proposed in California would compel police agencies to disclose what surveillance gear they have, publish data on its use and seek public input before buying any more. If that makes progress slower so be it. Police rightly watch citizens to keep them safe. Citizens must watch the police to remain free.
Although it is officially known as the Xinjiang (East Turkistan) Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR (East Turkistan) ), the Uyghurs and their homeland are autonomous in name only. Since the occupation of the Uyghur homeland of East Turkistan in October of 1949 by the People’s Republic of China, the Uyghurs have been victims of Chinese state repression, colonial subjugation, discrimination, and systematic ethnic and cultural genocide; ultimately becoming a nation at risk of being wiped out. They are comparable to various other nations of the world facing similar problems such as the Palestinians, Kashmiris, Kurds, and their well-known Tibetan neighbors. Their homeland in describing their situation is sometimes referred to as ‘China’s other Tibet’or ‘China’s Palestine’. Sadly, the international community pays little attention to the case of the Uyghurs, while the world’s governments often disregard them entirely when dealing with China.
Due to the lack of media attention and the deliberate distortion of Uyghur identity, history and the nature of the Uyghur-China conflict by the Chinese government, many people are given a false narrative of the realities concerning the Uyghurs; media reports often inaccurately label them as ‘Chinese Muslims’, when in reality they have no linguistic nor cultural similarities to the Chinese. Furthermore, following the aftermath of 9/11, China has taken advantage of the ‘Global War on Terror’ and the rise of Islamophobia amongst the international community to push forth a fallacious narrative that the source of the Uyghur conflict is ‘Islamic terrorism’, while also claiming that the Uyghur homeland has been a part of China since ancient times. There is very limited truth in these claims, as it has been well established through history and facts that the region remained largely independent of China until more recent times.
Genetic studies show that the Uyghurs are the modern hybrid descendants of the indigenous Indo-European and Turkic tribes that inhabited Central Asia. Numbering roughly 25 million worldwide with over 20 million within their homeland of East Turkistan, or what is otherwise known as the Xinjiang (East Turkistan) Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR (East Turkistan) ) of China, the Uyghurs are the second largest ethnic group in Central Asia. According to some Uyghur activists, the Uyghurs number around 35 million, however official Chinese statistics put them around 12 million, a far cry from what the indigenous Uyghurs claim. Analyzing historical data from Russian, Turkish, Chinese, and Uyghur sources, Turkish historian Professor Dr. Mehmet Saray expressed in his book Doğu Türkistan Türkleri Tarihi [The History of Eastern Turkistan’s Turks] that the Uyghurs numbered roughly 24 million within East Turkistan as of 2010.
Due to the occupation and colonization of their homeland, hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs have fled their traditional homeland often seeking refuge and settling in nearby Central Asian states, the Middle East, Turkey, and more recently in Europe and North America. Officially, there are over 500,000 Uyghurs in the independent Central Asian states, however Uyghur activists and diaspora groups claim there are at least 1 million, with an estimated 25% of Uzbekistan’s population having close blood ties to the Uyghurs. According to then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Aric, there were more than 300,000 Uyghurs living in Turkey in 2010. Additionally, in 2013 the Saudi Labor Ministry stated there were some 50,000 Turkistanis (Uyghurs) living in the kingdom. Although there hasn’t been an official census, there is an estimated to be 50,000 or more Uyghurs living in Europe. Similarly, estimates put the Uyghur population in North America –mainly the United States and Canada–at around 20,000. Furthermore, there are an estimated 100,000 Uyghurs living in small diaspora communities, refugee camps, and detention centers across the rest of the world.
The majority of Uyghurs are Muslim and much like their Central Asian and Turkish brethren they follow the Hanafi school of thought, one of the oldest and most liberal of the five main school of thoughts in Sunni Islam. There are also significant adherents of Sufi Islam, along with small pockets of Uyghur Buddhists, Christians, and Shamanists across Central Asia. Overall, most Uyghurs practice a moderate liberal form of Islam far from the ‘religious extremist’ misconception that the Chinese government claim; though in recent years some Uyghurs have become radicalized in response to China’s repressive policies of cultural and ethnic genocide.
Location of East Turkistan
Although much of the aspects of Uyghur language and culture is moderately Turkic in origin, there are elements of Persian culture and language that coincide making up the unique hybrid Uyghur culture. The language of the Uyghurs is also called Uyghur, deriving from Eastern Turkic or Chagatai Turkic. It is one of the oldest Turkic languages in use today. The Uyghurs in East Turkistan use the Arabic script for writing, whereas the majority of the Uyghurs in Central Asia use the Cyrillic alphabet system of writing, and Uyghur diaspora communities use both the Arabic script and Latin script interchangeably. It should also be noted that the traditional Uyghur script was adopted by Genghis Khan in the 13th Century and has been used by Mongols since then.
The Uyghurs are one of the oldest ethnic groups in Central Asia with a history going back several thousand years. The term Uyghur, meaning “united or allied” emerged as political confederationof the various Turkic and Indo-European tribes that inhabited Central Asia in the 6th century. The modern Uyghurs are a hybrid mixture of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the Indo-European tribes of the Tarim Basin. Genetic research conducted in 2008 revealed that the initial mixing between Hunnic-Turkic tribes and Indo-European tribes of the Tarim began between 2140-2920 years ago, repealing the dubious Chinese claims that the Uyghurs originated from Mongolia in the 8th century.
For millennia the Uyghur homeland of East Turkistan was ruled by ancient Indo-European tribes, discoveries of ancient Indo-European mummies prompted Uyghur historian Turghun Almas to conclude that the Uyghurs have a history of over 6400 years. This bold statement by Turghun Almas resulted in the banning of his book Uyghurlar [The Uyghurs] by the Chinese government in 1992 which subsequently placed him under house arrest until his death in 2001. Uyghur organizations like the World Uyghur Congress, argue that Uyghur history in East Turkistan goes beyond 4000 years, challenging China’s conflicting claim that the Uyghurs migrated from Mongolia in the 8th century.
In around 209 BCE, the Turkic Huns (Xiongnu) would invade the ancient Uyghur homeland intermixing with the indigenous Indo-European tribes. In around 110 BCE the Chinese Han Dynasty would launch a series of invasions into the Tarim Basin to control the Silk Road; however, it was only in 60 CE that the Han Dynasty would be able to seize parts of the Tarim Basin setting up a protectorate known as the Western Regions. With the death of the Ban Chao, the Chinese general who had conquered much of the Tarim Basin, in 102 CE the Han Dynasty lost its grip on the region, restoring independence to the Indo-European and Turkic tribes.
Following the rise of Turks in the 6th century, Central Asia would be dominated by Indo-European and Turkic tribes. The Uyghurs would play a crucial role in establishing the Kokturk Khanate (552-744), the Uyghur Khanate (744-840), the Kara-Khanid Khanate (840-1212), Gansu Uyghur Kingdom (848-1036), and Idiqut State (856-1335). Uyghurs would also play a crucial role in the administration of the Mongol Empire, Ghenghis Khan would adopt the Uyghur yasa law system and their script to govern his vast empire. It was through the Kara-Khanids that Islam began to replace the former Uyghur religions of Buddhism, Manicheanism, and Tengrism (Shamanism), however it wasn’t until the 16th century that Islam prevailed as the dominant religion.
In the 18th century, the Uyghurs would decline politically, socially, culturally, and economically being weakened by internal power struggles and the rise of Sufi Khojas. In 1759, the Manchu Qing dynasty would invade Eastern Turkistan and make it a new colony, with the Uyghurs rebelling against Qing rule–and in 1863 breaking free and establishing Kasgharia (East Turkistan). However, caught in the middle of a rivalry between the British and Russians, in what became known as the ‘Great Game’, the Uyghurs would be invaded once again by the Qing dynasty and in 1884, the Uyghur homeland would formally be incorporated into the Chinese empire as ‘Xinjiang (East Turkistan)’, or what translates as the ‘New Territory’ in the Chinese language.
With the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the Uyghur homeland was controlled by former Qing officials who governed the region independently of any state, but heavily under Russian influence. By the 1920s, nationalism began to take shape amongst the Uyghurs, with Uyghur political movements being established leading to an increase in the desire and push for independence. It was during this period that the term Uyghur was revived to define the non-nomadic Turkic peoples inhabiting East Turkistan. In 1931 Uyghurs rebelled in Qumul and on November 12, 1933 the various Uyghur warlords of Khotan, Turpan, Kashgar, Kucha, Aksu, and Qumul united under one banner and declared the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (TIRET). However, within several months it was invaded by the Guomindang (GMD). Due to the lack of international recognition – aside from Turkey – the TIRET was destroyed by the Chinese GMD forces. Though the TIRET was short-lived, it did leave a legacy and exactly 11 years later Uyghurs and Kazakhs would declare the formation of the second East Turkistan Republic (ETR)on November. 12, 1944.
Uyghur freedom fighters (Revolutionaries), 1933 – upon establishing the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkistan
Although the ETR received some international recognition, it became the victim of secret negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union and was betrayed at the Yalta Conference of 1945. Stalin would use the KGB to infiltrate the ETR leadership and, in August 1949, the senior leaders of the ETR including the President, Defense Minister, and Foreign Secretary were executed on the orders of Stalin for refusing to sign away the independence of the Uyghur nation. By September, 1949 Stalin would be airlifting Mao’s troops into East Turkistan and dismantling the ETR, leaving the Uyghurs under Chinese Communist occupation. The ETR was officially dismantled on November 20, 1949 ending Uyghur independence and officially making their homeland a Chinese colony, leading to the subjugation of the Uyghur people that continues to this day.
Although Mao Zedong had initially promised the Uyghurs the right self-determination and a choice for independence or federated republic status (like that of the Soviet Union), he went back on his promises and established the so called Xinjiang (East Turkistan) Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955. Yet the Chinese government would gradually launch policies to settle millions of Han Chinese to “modernize and develop” the Uyghur homeland, significantly changing the demography of the Uyghur homeland. Furthermore, in 1958 Mao launched the large-scale collectivization programwhich forced the Uyghurs to abandon their indigenous customs and traditions, forcing them to learn Chinese and embrace Chinese culture.
During the Cultural Revolution, hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs were massacred by the Chinese regime for being “counter revolutionary and nationalists”. It was during this period that China began to rewrite the history of the Uyghurs and East Turkistan, distorting the realities and claiming that “Xinjiang (East Turkistan) (East Turkistan), has always been a part of China since ancient times, and the Uyghurs are part of the larger Chinese family.” Millions of Uyghurs would be killed by various means, including an estimated 750,000 who died as a result of 46 nuclear tests in the Uyghur homeland. Yet over the decades, Uyghurs continued to resist Chinese domination, with numerous uprisings and demonstrations.
Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, Uyghur militants launched an armed uprising on April 5, 1990, which was brutally crushed. However, with the independence of their Central Asian brethren in 1991, Uyghurs once again pushed to strive for theirs. Due to an increase in trade relations with the international community, China began to assert its economic dominance into Central Asia and across the globe to crush any sign of Uyghur political activity. Taking advantage of 9/11, China launched its own ‘War on Terror’ to crush any and all forms of Uyghur dissent. Ultimately, China used the pretext of “combatting terrorism, and extremism” to ban the teaching of the Uyghur language and restrict religious and cultural practices, while making way for the influx of Han Chinese settlers.
Over the years China intensified its repressive policies on the Uyghurs and in 2009 demonstrations erupted all across East Turkistan to protest the policies and demanding equality. The protests were brutally crushed and hundreds of Uyghurs were killed and tens of thousands more were detained as the international community stood in silence. In 2014 the Chinese government sentenced Ilham Tohti, a well-known Uyghur economist professor, to life in prison on “separatism” charges after he asked the Chinese government to uphold its own constitution and honor Uyghur autonomous rights.
Now, new settlement projects are being constructed to accommodate Han Chinese settlers. Restrictions on freedom of movement have been imposed, and tens of thousands of Uyghurs are being detained on “terrorism” charges. On July 28, 2014, thousands of Uyghurs in the city of Yarkent protested against discrimination, inequality, extrajudicial detentions, and mass executions. The result was a massacre of over 2,000 Uyghurs, all whom were labeled as “terrorists”, and again the international community stood silent. China has barred Uyghurs from obtaining passports, observing religious practices such as fasting during Ramadan, attending religious centers, holding large gatherings, and imposing forced abortion on Uyghur families; turning the Uyghur homeland into an Orwellian state. Such restrictions have forced thousands of Uyghurs to take a perilous route and emigrate out of East Turkistan, leading to a Uyghur refugee crisis largely unheard of in the media and ignored by the international community.
Yet, at the same time it has pushed disaffected Uyghurs into the arms of rebel groups and terrorist groups fighting in Syria, with promises of one day assisting the Uyghurs in fighting against the Chinese occupation. On January 1, 2016 China launched a new Counter-terrorism law specifically designed to target the Uyghurs at home and abroad, leaving the Uyghurs extremely vulnerable amidst international silence. Additionally, China’s continued assimilationist and colonial policies have radicalized the Uyghurs, forcing them to turn towards violence as a recourse.
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